The cat lives (Metlifecare takeover)

I had blogged a few months back about Asia Pacific trying to use the MAC clause to get out of an agreement to buy shares in Metlifecare (Shrodinger’s arrangement). As it turns out, a new agreement was entered into and approved by the court. Some interesting arguments regarding the role of hedge funds came up in litigation regarding the new agreement.

Asia Pacific was set to acquire shares in Metlifecare at $7 per share as set out in a Scheme Implementation Agreement (SIA) prior to the onset of Covid19 and its consequent impact of the economy. Asia Pacific had attempted to use  the MAC clause in the SIA to terminate the agreement. While this matter was still being litigated, Asia Pacific made a new non-binding offer which offered $6 per share. A revised SIA indicating the new offer price was entered into. The earlier litigation was settled as a condition of entering into the new SIA. A shareholders meeting to consider and vote on the new SIA was then convened. The new offer price was still kosher as per the independent audit report which set the price of Metlifecare’s shares in the range between $5.80 and $6.90 per share. The resolution was passed with 90.7% majority and Metlifecare sought the High Court’s approval of the scheme as required by s 236 of the Companies Act.

One shareholder, ResIL opposed the resolution. Although ResIL later withdrew its application, Lang J noted that the court must still consider it while determining the application to approve the SIA. One of the things considered was the Takeover Panel’s no-objection statement. As Lang J said, “the fact that …the Takeovers Panel has independently concluded that Metlifecare provided shareholders with sufficient material to satisfy Takeover Code requirements is obviously a matter of considerable significance in the present context”.

However, ResIl’s arguments with respect to the role played by hedge funds are interesting. REsIl argued that the hedge funds and other foreign institutional investors had acquired shares in Metlifecare after the first Asia Pacific offer was made and were now pressuring the board to accept the offer on the table so as to make a profit on the shares they had acquired. ResIl argued that shareholders were not informed of the role of hedge funds in pressuring the board to agree to the new offer price until the meeting where the resolution to approve the Scheme was put.

The Metlifecare board’s version of what transpired is that although the board came under pressure to enter into the replacement transaction with Asia Pacific from at least one hedge fund shareholder, the hedge funds did not force it to enter into the new SIA. “Rather, the directors unanimously considered it was in the interests of shareholders to consider the new proposal and made the decision to enter into the new SIA for that reason”.

Lang J went on to say that the Scheme booklet (provided to shareholders) need not have contained the level of detail about institutional investors as argued by ResIl. He further says [at 36 and 37]:

It was for shareholders to decide whether to vote for or against the scheme based on their own circumstances and not those of other shareholders. As Mr Arthur points out on Metlifecare’s behalf, in any publicly listed company the aims and aspirations of shareholders will inevitably differ. Some will acquire shares with a view to realising capital gains and/or dividends over time whilst others will hope to sell within the short to medium term. The respective positions of these two groups may be irreconcilable where, as here, an offer is made for the acquisition of all the shares in a company for a cash consideration.

Metlifecare’s shareholders therefore needed to consider their own positions when deciding whether to vote in favour or against the resolution. They did not need to know the identity of the institutional shareholders who had already indicated their support for the scheme or why those shareholders held that view. If individual shareholders were interested in those issues they were free to attend the meeting and to ask questions about them.

ResIl had also “whether the scheme was such that an intelligent and honest business person might reasonably approve it”. The court noted that “an intelligent business person would also have been aware that rejection of the scheme would inevitably cause the company’s share price to fall sharply in the short and medium term”. The price could even fall lower than the share price prior to Asia Pacific’s second offer because the institutional investors would have sold their shares once it was clear that the scheme would fail.

Ironically, as the court pointed out, ResIl was itself not a long term shareholder and had only bought the shares after Asia Pacific’s offer had been announced.

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